ТАЈПЕЈ - Тајвански истраживачи направили су робота који може да ради као рецепционар, туристички водич, чувар и помоћник љекара.

Интерактивни робот Моника, тежак 60 килограма, у стању је да разазнаје људе у довољној мјери да може да их уведе у пословну зграду и у ванредној ситуацији пошаље СМС поруку радницима обезбјеђења, изјавио је вођа пројекта Рен Луо.

Сензорске функције му омогућавају да оствари одређени степен интеракције са докторима и пацијентима, нарочито када пацијент падне.

Туристи могу да искористе робота висине 100 центиметара и питају га за правац.

"Унутар роботске заједнице, ово је прилично импресивно, зато што овај робот може да замијени толико људских функција", изјавио је Луо, професор са Националног универзитета Тајвана.

Тајван, један од лидера у производњи компјутера, покушава да заузме већи удио у тржишту роботике, које је вриједно 18 милијарди долара.

Тајван планира да до 2015. године оствари удио од седам одсто на тржишту робота и извозу широм свијета

Истраживачи су већ ступили у контакт са произвођачима ради масовне производње робота Моника, рекао је Луо. Тренутна цијена овог апарата је 12.500 долара.

робот може да замијени толико људских функција

Najveci skeptik po pitanju AI je napisao jednu knjigu o tome zasto nikad necemo imati masine koje zamijenjuju ljude (doduse
treba i spomenuti i to da je on bio prvi covjek u istoriji koji je izgubio partiju saha protiv kompjutera )

Dreyfus's critique of artificial intelligence (AI) concerns what he considers to be the four primary assumptions of AI research. The first two assumptions he criticizes are what he calls the "biological" and "psychological" assumptions. The biological assumption is that the brain is analogous to computer hardware and the mind is analogous to computer software. The psychological assumption is that the mind works by performing discrete computations (in the form of algorithmic rules) on discrete representations or symbols.

Dreyfus claims that the plausibility of the psychological assumption rests on two others: the epistemological and ontological assumptions. The epistemological assumption is that all activity (either by animate or inanimate objects) can be formalised (mathematically) in the form of predictive rules or laws. The ontological assumption is that reality consists entirely of a set of mutually independent, atomic (indivisible) facts. It's because of the epistemological assumption that workers in the field argue that intelligence is the same as formal rule-following, and it's because of the ontological one that they argue that human knowledge consists entirely of internal representations of reality.

On the basis of these two assumptions, workers in the field claim that cognition is the manipulation of internal symbols by internal rules, and that, therefore, human behaviour is, to a large extent, context free (see contextualism). Therefore a truly scientific psychology is possible, which will detail the 'internal' rules of the human mind, in the same way the laws of physics detail the 'external' laws of the physical world. But it is this key assumption that Dreyfus denies. In other words, he argues that we cannot now (and never will) be able to understand our own behavior in the same way as we understand objects in, for example, physics or chemistry: that is, by considering ourselves as things whose behaviour can be predicted via 'objective', context free scientific laws. According to Dreyfus, a context free psychology is a contradiction in terms.

Dreyfus's arguments against this position are taken from the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition (especially the work of Martin Heidegger). Heidegger argued that, contrary to the cognitivist views on which AI is based, our being is in fact highly context bound, which is why the two context-free assumptions are false. Dreyfus doesn't deny that we can choose to see human (or any) activity as being 'law governed', in the same way that we can choose to see reality as consisting of indivisible atomic facts...if we wish. But it is a huge leap from that to state that because we want to or can see things in this way that it is therefore an objective fact that they are the case. In fact, Dreyfus argues that they are not (necessarily) the case, and that, therefore, any research program that assumes they are will quickly run into profound theoretical and practical problems. Therefore the current efforts of workers in the field are doomed to failure.

Given that Dreyfus has a reputation as a Luddite in some quarters, it's important to emphasise that he doesn't believe that AI is fundamentally impossible; only that the current research program is fatally flawed. Instead he argues that to get a device (or devices) with human-like intelligence would require them to have a human-like being-in-the-world, which would require them to have bodies more or less like ours, and social acculturation (i.e. a society) more or less like ours. (This view is shared by psychologists in the embodied psychology (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) and distributed cognition traditions. His opinions are similar to those of robotics researchers such as Rodney Brooks as well as researchers in the field of artificial life.)

Instead he argues that to get a device (or devices) with human-like intelligence would require them to have a human-like being-in-the-world, which would require them to have bodies more or less like ours, and social acculturation (i.e. a society) more or less like ours.

ŠEFA nemačke stranke “Levica” Oskara Lafontena (66), u četvrtak je operisao robot! Ovaj političar, oboleo od karcinoma prostate, podvrgao se intervenciji na univerzitetskoj klinici u Hamburgu. Prepustio se veštim metalnim rukama hirurga “Da Vinčija” koji naročitom metodom pristupa toj malignoj bolesti.
Lafonten, svetskoj javnosti poznat kao bivši socijaldemokrata, najzaslužniji je za neočekivano nagli proboj “Levice” u nemačke političke strukture. Ova operacija, standardna u SAD, traje oko tri sata i, u odnosu na klasičnu, ima mnogobrojne prednosti: minimalan gubitak krvi, kratak (petodnevni) boravak u bolnici i očuvanje erektilne funkcije.
Robot “Da Vinči” košta 1,6 miliona evra, ali profesor dr Mihael Štokle kaže da se “isplati svaki cent”. Tokom zahvata, on maltene istovremeno seče i zašiva rez, a stereo-kamere emituju trodimenzionalne snimke svakog poteza.
Dok su tamošnji mediji u četvrtak listom debatovali o mogućem nasledniku na kormilu “Levice” - što su iz ove stranke okarakterisali kao neukusno i neljudsko ponašanje - dnevnik “Bild”, detaljno je pisao o operaciji i hirurgu “Da Vinčiju”. Ovaj list, između ostalog, precizira da je automobil sa dva čoveka zadužena za obezbeđenje, po pacijenta stigao u 5,45. Crni audi je, tačno u 6,34 dovezao Lafontena pred kliniku, a u 8,00 on je već ležao na operacionom stolu. “Da Vinči” ga je čekao, spreman.